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Abstract: Over the last two decades Kazakhstan has implemented foreign policies 
aimed at improving relations with many new geopolitical actors, besides longstanding 
common partners such as Russia, on which it was formerly heavily dependent. By 
utilising its huge hydrocarbon production potential, Kazakhstan has managed to surpass 
all other Central Asian states in political and economic importance. Kazakhstan has now 
turned its eyes to China, seeing it as an important and powerful partner in the economic, 
political and security spheres. This article deals with fundamental issues in 
Kazakhstan‟s relations with China. 
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Kazakhstan has become an important player in Central Asia‟s regional relations in 
recent years. International observers have underscored the many positive changes 
made by the country. Kazakhstan has achieved higher levels of real economic and 
social development than other regional states. In macroeconomic terms, Kazakhstan 
has the largest economy in Central Asia and has recorded impressive growth levels 
since it gained independence in 1991. It quickly recovered from the depths of the 
2008/09 world economic crisis.1 Kazakhstan‟s success is worth underscoring, as it is the 
only Central Asian country that appears in the list of countries with a high level of 
Human Development.2 
 
However, it seems that a well-coordinated effort is being made by Astana and European 
Union members to overestimate the country‟s achievements, while conscientiously 
ignoring its problems.3 Western pundits also sometimes seem unwilling to criticise the 
“Kazakhstani path”4 of development, although the country still has serious infrastructure 
problems,5 has an authoritarian political system and an insufficient diverse economic 
base.6 It should be apparent to all stakeholders that, regardless of how impressive 
Kazakhstan‟s economic performance might appear at first glance, there is room for 
further improvement. The country is still largely dependent on its neighbours in various 
economic sectors and is continuously seeking opportunities to sustain its growth 
through regional and global economic cooperation. In that sense, China-Kazakhstan 
relations are especially important, not only in terms of overall trade turnover between 
the two countries, but because of the sustainability of both the “Kazakhstani path” and 
Central Asia‟s stability.   
 
Kazakhstan-China relations 
 
Political relations between Kazakhstan and China have been cordial since 1991, the 
year Kazakhstan achieved independence. Old disputes over their common border have 
been settled and closer political contacts established. Chinese and Kazakhstani officials 
often meet to discuss bilateral issues and, according to Astana, “…developing and 
maintaining good neighborly relations with China is a top priority.”7 Both countries are 
members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and other regional and sub-
regional groupings committed to promoting political cooperation, economic 
development, and security. This strong reciprocal support is deemed essential to 
achieve some of their most important mutual foreign policy goals. For instance, 
Kazakhstan supports Beijing‟s “One China” policy, thus supporting Beijing‟s official 
position on Taiwan and Tibet,8 while China backs Kazakhstan‟s almost two decade-long 
bid to become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).9  
 
Equally positive are their bilateral economic relations, which have been intensifying for 
many years. China‟s willingness and ability to invest in Kazakhstan has been the main 
factor driving continual improvement in their trade relations.10 Impressive figures support 
these economic relations. In early 2011, for example, Beijing made a loan worth $1.7 
billion to the Kazakhstani National Welfare Fund (Samruk-Kazyna) and another worth 
$5 billion to the Kazakhstani petrochemical industry, in addition to pledging to buy 
Kazakhstani uranium for an estimated $8 billion.11  
 
Astana welcomes this uptick in the Chinese influence, as it contributes to diversifying 
the country‟s economy. Mutual trade relations were for many years concentrated in gas 
and oil exports from Kazakhstan to China. However, they have now entered into a 
process of diversification, and positive outcomes are expected from further economic 
integration between the two countries, especially in the border regions.12 
 
Improved bilateral relations underscore these beneficial developments and might in the 
midterm help Kazakhstan consolidate its achievements. Since 2011 Kazakhstani and 
Chinese state officials have come together several times to discuss economic, political, 
cultural and security issues. In June 2011, Chinese Presidents Hu Jintao and 
Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev discussed the specifics of their security 
partnership, signed in 2005, and affixed their signatures on a document on 
“Development of an all-round strategic partnership”, which stipulates a commitment to 
enhance bilateral trade and increase the frequency of meetings between top officials.13 
Since the beginning of the 2000s Kazakhstan-China relations have been put on a strong 
footing. Nazarbayev and Hu Jintao, when they meet, leave the impression of sharing a 
deep understanding. Kazakhstan‟s presidency of the SCO in the second half of 2011 
provided many opportunities for the two heads of state to discuss face-to-face various 
aspects of bilateral cooperation. Chinese officials have repeatedly expressed 
satisfaction with the evolution of bilateral trade relations in recent times and strongly 
supported the opening of the Khorgos International Centre of Boundary Cooperation, a 
transnational free trade centre on the border of Kazakhstan and China, spanning a 3.36 
million m² area of Chinese territory and 1.6 million m² acres of Kazakhstani land.14  
 
Kazakhstani and Chinese officials have ample reason to be content with the trade 
volumes between the two countries. In 2011, the bilateral trade volume amounted to 
$20 billion, up from a disappointing $8.3 billion in 2006. This is a significantly larger 
volume than the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia, two countries that are 
trying to boost their trade through a customs union.15 Initially, Astana and Beijing set the 
goal of reaching a trade volume of $15 billion by 2015. Fortunately, the value of bilateral 
trade is already, in the first quarter of 2012, $5 billion above the planned level.16 Besides 
trade, Kazakhstan‟s friendship is also essential for China since it is a major transit 
country. For instance, the improvement of the railway connection between northwest 
China and southeast Kazakhstan and onward into Russia and Western Europe, was on 
the top of the agenda in their bilateral discussion. 
 
These developments indicate that Kazakhstan is an increasingly important player in 
China‟s strategy in the Central Asia region, while Russia‟s influence in that region is 
steadily declining in relative terms. China, Turkey and, to a much lesser extent, Iran, are 
making rapid gains at the expense of Russia. This trend is evidenced both by data, as 
noted above, and by changes observable in both domestic markets and traditional 
bazaars across the region. The increasing Chinese presence is even changing the 
lifestyles of ordinary people. The flood of cheap and affordable Chinese goods has 
allowed Central Asians, even in the smallest and most remote villages, to buy products 
that they previously had never dreamed of seeing. In all probability, Russia will become 
progressively less able to hinder China‟s penetration into the region. Commercially, the 
future does not look enviable for Moscow as by 2015 the bilateral trade between China 
and Kazakhstan is expected to reach $40 billion,17 an increase that will further 
strengthen China‟s foothold in Central Asia. 
 
Much to Moscow‟s dismay, improvements in Kazakhstani-Chinese economic relations 
are expected to increase even further in the years to come. At the end of September 
2011, Chinese and Kazakhstani business people met to discuss investment projects 
between the two countries. The Chairman of the Standing Committee of China‟s 
National People‟s Congress, Wu Bangguo, who attended the meeting, focused the talks 
on future cooperation possibilities in energy, mineral extraction, metallurgy, road and 
railway construction, telecommunications and agriculture. He also drew attention to the 
need to improve cooperation between Kazakhstani and Chinese firms and augment the 
volume of investments.18 Perhaps more importantly, Bangguo insisted that there are 
many opportunities for cooperation in manufacturing and service sectors.  
 
Since independence Kazakhstan‟s president has been adamant about the necessity to 
diversify the Kazakhstani economy away from energy production and export, as this 
makes the country too dependent on fluctuating oil and gas prices. A rapidly developing 
partner like China would certainly help President Nazerbayev achieve this objective. 
However, one can only be doubtful whether Chinese investments and cooperation will 
actually bring about economic diversification in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstani elite, on 
which this process of diversification depends heavily, may not actually have a strong 
enough interest in altering the present economic structure. Kazakhstan‟s historical 
experience has demonstrated that poorly diversified economies, which rely heavily on 
natural resources for generating revenues, are the best models political and economic 
elites can use to indulge in kleptocracy.19 It remains to be seen whether the 
Kazakhstan-China economic partnership will serve the interests of ordinary 
Kazakhstanis or merely the members of the president‟s circle. 
 
Energy cooperation 
 
Energy development and export largely dominates Kazakhstani-Chinese relations. 
Beijing considers Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, a crucial 
element in its energy equation and has geared its policy in such a way as to secure as 
many resources as possible from this region.20 Central Asia can play a major role in 
helping Beijing diversify its energy suppliers. It can also reduce, by the same token, 
China‟s reliance on Middle East oil exporters, who exported to China more than two 
million barrels/day in 2010.21 Beijing keeps a close eye on the current political events in 
the Middle East, and the instability that comes with them. Chinese policy planners 
develop alternative policies which could be implemented in the event that the United 
States decides to close, or at least filter, the Strait of Malacca, through which oil cargoes 
from the Middle East must pass.22 Under these circumstances, China‟s oil and gas 
imports from Central Asia will probably continue over the next few years – even 
potentially for decades – prompting the expansion of the energy sectors of the Central 
Asian hydrocarbon-rich states. Furthermore, Chinese imports of Central Asian oil and 
gas will divert a massive amount of revenue from China to Central Asia, in addition to 
providing a powerful alternative buyer to Russia.23 This will in turn give Central Asian 
governments more political leeway in their international relations. Kazakhstan seems 
quite conscious of this situation, and is accordingly currying favour with China, knowing 
the many benefits it could potentially reap.   
 
The spectacular economic growth in the PRC in the last twenty years has generated 
intensive use of primary energy resources. Since the first half of the nineties, China has 
not been able to meet all its energy needs from its own production and has thus, 
become a net importer of oil and gas. The country became a net importer of natural gas 
in 2008 as the gap between supply and demand approached 5 billion cubic meters. 
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, have 
abundant reserves of oil and are export-oriented economies. Therefore, the Chinese 
authorities have progressively made energy a priority issue on their Central Asian 
agenda. This development has important implications and can be analysed from various 
angles. First, both China‟s own perspective on its present boom and how Beijing‟s 
involvement in the Central Asian republics‟ development is perceived, need to be taken 
into consideration. Second, the growing role of Central Asian energy issues in China‟s 
policy has important geopolitical implications, specifically on the relations between 
Moscow and Beijing. Energy is one of the strategic issues where the interests of Beijing 
and Moscow are clearly divergent and it has the potential to complicate the cooperative 
atmosphere the two powers have enjoyed in recent years. Moreover, it is necessary to 
contextualise the Caspian Basin‟s place within the overall energy strategy of the PRC.  
 
Kazakhstan has become one of China‟s main energy suppliers. In 2011, 11 million tons 
of oil flowed to China through the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, which runs from 
Kazakhstan‟s Caspian shore to Xinjiang in China.24 During a September 2011 visit to 
Central Asia, Chinese officials expressed their desire to expand energy trade with oil-
rich Kazakhstan.25 The latter‟s oil exports are set to swell over the next few years. 
Astana is expecting a 50 per cent increase by 2020,26 and China will receive the lion‟s 
share of this, as its domestic demand is increasing dramatically. Kazakhstan plans to 
export 22 million tons/year of oil to China by 2020, up from 12.1 million tons in 2011.27 
To achieve this, it is currently boosting the export capacity of the Kazakhstan-China 
pipeline and constructing a parallel gas pipeline scheduled for completion by 2014.28 
This additional pipeline will also enable Kazakhstan to transport gas extracted in the 
western part of the country, where most of the deposits are located, to the more 
industrialised southern regions, reducing by the same token their reliance on Uzbek gas 
imports.29 
 
As in other areas, the purchase of oil deposits and the signing up on long-term energy 
supply contracts are the main instruments used by China to influence the energy sector 
of Central Asian states. In 1997, after three years of negotiations, the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) began operating in Kazakhstan. Other major Chinese 
firms soon followed. In addition, Beijing and Astana signed in that year an agreement to 
construct a pipeline of almost 4,800 kilometers connecting the Caspian Sea and the 
Xinjiang region in northwest China.  
 
The construction of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline was divided into three sections. 
The first section, linking Atyrau (North Caspian) with Aktobe‟s region oil fields (western 
Kazakhstan) was completed in March 2003. This section also carries oil to the west, 
towards the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, which connects the Tengiz oil 
field in Kazakhstan with the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, through 
Atyrau. The second 1,000-kilometer section was built between September 2004 and 
December 2005 and links Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the border town of Alashankou 
in China‟s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Like all other milestones in China's 
Central Asian energy development, the opening of this section of nearly 1,000 miles 
generated much debate and some stridency. However, the Atasu-Alashankou section, 
the most important of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, is able to deliver only 10 million 
tons of crude oil a year to China, a modest amount considering China‟s oil needs. The 
third and final section, which connects Kenkiyak with Kumpol, was as per an agreement 
between Kazakhstan and China on August 18, 2007 and completed on July 11, 2009. 
This pipeline makes it possible to pump oil directly from the northern Caspian to the 
Dushanzi refinery in Xinjiang. 
 
To feed the pipeline China has acquired, through various companies, exploitation rights 
to various oil fields in Kazakhstan. In the process Chinese companies have had to cope 
with both, the suspicion their presence arouses and the relative delay in getting 
anything done, thus harming their position in the coveted Kazakh Caspian offshore 
fields. The exception is the Darkhan deposit, which they exploit under an agreement 
signed in October 2008. However, making a virtue of necessity and following a 
consistent business strategy, China has invested in oil fields located in the Aktobe 
region and in other more isolated sites along the route of the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline 
(Buzachi North, Karazhanbas and Kumkol in the Kyzyl-Orda region).30 These, along 
with the aforementioned Atasu connection to the pipeline going to Russia, make the 
Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline an alternative route for exporting Russian oil from Western 
Siberia to China. As a result, Beijing has virtually assured sources of supply for a 
pipeline which currently has a maximum annual capacity of 20 million tons of crude that 
could be expanded to 30. 
 
The most significant Chinese investments in the Kazakh hydrocarbon sector have been 
the $4.2 takeover of PetroKazakhstan, a Canadian-based company, by Chinese oil 
company China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) in August 2005 and the purchase for 
US$1.91 billion of the Kazakhstan oil assets of Canada's Nations Energy Company Ltd by the 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) in December 2006. 
Through these two acquisitions Beijing acquired an important position in the Kazakh oil 
market and although the figures available vary substantially and are difficult to compute, 
it is estimated that in 2006 China was responsible about 25 per cent of all oil extraction 
in Kazakhstan.31 
 
This increase in China‟s presence in the Kazakh oil sector generated an animated 
public debate led by those who see in Beijing's policy a growing threat to Kazakhstan‟s 
economic sovereignty and autonomous development prospects. While some local 
analysts are known to dissent from the majority view and point out, for example, that 
contracts signed with Chinese companies are more beneficial to Kazakhstan than those 
signed with large Western companies, the controversy over the Chinese acquisitions 
has more particularly culminated in the Majlis, the parliament of Kazakhstan, which 
approved in September 2007 the introduction of a series of amendments to the law “on 
subsurface and the use of the subsurface” dated January 27, 1996. The law expanded 
Astana‟s ability to revise or annul contracts concerning the exploitation of subsurface 
resources and posing a threat to “national economic security interests.”32 As a response 
to the $1.9 billion sale of the Karazhanbas oilfield by Canada-based Nations Energy to 
CITIC, the Kazakh government passed a law preventing foreign investors from selling 
stakes in Kazakhstan‟s assets to third parties. Also, the 2005 sale of PetroKazakhstan 
Inc. to CNPC illustrated the need for the new law giving Kazakhstan the first right of 
refusal to buy asset in any proposed transfer of oil asset between foreign companies. 
Also, KasMunaiGas became a stakeholder in PetroKazakhstan in 2005, and following 
the passage of this amendment, KasMunaiGas executed an agreement with CITIC to 
purchase 50 per cent of Karazhanbas. It is interesting to note that the above 
PetroKazakhstan purchase created a similar reaction in Russia, especially among 
companies active in Kazakhstan, which share these misgivings about the progressive 
Chinese encroachment.  
 
The purchase of the Canadian firm by the CNPC led to the Russian company Lukoil, 
which owns 25 per cent of the rights to the North Kumkol deposit, to go to both, the 
Court of International Arbitration in Stockholm and the Kazakh courts to claim a 
preferential right to acquire the deposit. Through this action, Lukoil, which won the 
lawsuit, secured the rights to the entire reservoir. Lukoil is officially a private oil 
company but its actions, as is well known in the energy industry, are often in line with 
the wishes of the Kremlin. Therefore, some authors believe that this action shows that 
“Russia is unwilling to allow China to have direct access to Central Asian energy 
resources.”33  
 
Within the SCO, which is paying increasing attention to energy issues, the approaches 
of Kazakhstan and Russia coincide. Despite the fear of potential dominance, 
Kazakhstan estimates that China‟s presence in its oil sector is of strategic importance in 
the long term. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline has already reduced Kazakhstan‟s 
dependence on the old Soviet pipeline network through which the majority of Kazakh oil 
exports still flow. The new pipeline allows direct access to the global economy, with its 
ever expanding oil consumption. Moreover, the weight of Chinese companies in the 
sector, though increasing, is still small in relative terms and barring new purchases of 
large deposits, their share in total Kazakh production will decrease very significantly 
when the extraction of oil from the offshore Kashagan field, situated in the northern part 
of the Caspian Sea, begins.34 
 
While energy will undoubtedly remain the nucleus of the China-Kazakhstan cooperation, 
Chinese officials hope that in future this cooperation will not remain limited to oil and 
gas; they believe that it should be extended to clean and renewable energy as well.35 In 
that regard, Beijing has singled out nuclear energy as a potentially important sector for 
bilateral cooperation. In 2011Kazakhstan, which is well endowed with uranium ore, 
began exporting the indispensable resource for producing nuclear energy to China.36  
 
These developments can only benefit Kazakhstan, as it requires new trading partners if 
it is to become one of the top five oil producers in the world.37 President Nazerbayev 
has also committed his country to diversifying the economy, which can be achieved 
through major investment in the renewable energy sector. 
 
Security cooperation 
 
Security is a top priority in China‟s Central Asian strategy. During his meeting with 
Nazarbayev in summer 2011 President Jintao stressed the importance of security. He 
particularly outlined what he considers the three main “evils” in Central Asia: 
separatism, extremism and terrorism.38 The list is not surprising, as it reflects Beijing‟s 
preoccupation with the destabilising activities in Xinjiang, a turbulent Chinese 
autonomous region, which has experienced sporadic outbursts of social violence. The 
Muslim and Turkic Uyghur, who constitute the majority of the population, claim that their 
region is a victim of Chinese discrimination, colonialism and oppression.39 The July 
2011 explosion of violence cast a shadow of pessimism over long-lasting stability in 
Xinjiang.40 Xinjiang is a strategic region for China, as all Central Asian oil and gas 
pipelines linking the eastern part of China to Central Asia run across that territory. The 
eruption of violence in this strategic territory could adversely impinge on Chinese oil 
imports and put at risk Beijing‟s energy security. 
 
It is no wonder then that the Chinese leadership is manifestly fearful of instability and 
religiously-motivated terrorism, as evidenced by China‟s vigorous pleas to enhance the 
role of the SCO to ensure regional stability.41 In this respect, security is more and more 
a determining factor in the relations between China and Kazakhstan, and in the short 
term it will have an increasingly important part to play within the SCO.42 Some 
Kazakhstani observers, however, believe that the Kazakhstan-China cooperation is 
actually much more a showcase of Beijing‟s diplomatic skills than a bona fide desire to 
establish friendly relations, while respecting Kazakhstan‟s sovereignty. They argue that 
true cooperation within the SCO will be difficult to achieve because Russia is unlikely to 
let the Central Asian states, with which it has strong and historical ties, drift away 
towards China without resistance.43 
 
For Beijing, the best way to promote security may actually be through deeper economic 
cooperation with Astana. China‟s policies towards the five republics of Central Asia seek 
quite unequivocally to integrate Xinjiang‟s economy with those of Central Asian states.44 
The Chinese often emphasise that the westernmost Chinese region shares deep 
cultural roots with Kazakhstan and that a trade partnership can only benefit the two, and 
the regions beyond. Bangguo, for instance, called the Khorgos centre a powerful 
opportunity to improve trade between Kazakhstan and China‟s western regions and 
increase cooperation at regional level.45 Beijing is currently implementing an ambitious 
plan to improve economic conditions in Xinjiang, reduce instances of social unrest and 
alleviate the frustration of the local Uyghur population. Kazakhstan‟s further economic 
integration into the Chinese northwest region has the potential to strengthen security 
through economic prosperity for an unpredictable and strategically pivotal region. 
 
Risky diversification 
 
A lack of diversification and a dependence on oil and gas exports are the two main 
problems of the Kazakhstani economy. China‟s investments in the secondary and 
tertiary economic sectors may prove the correct means to overcome these obstacles 
and gear the Kazakhstani economy towards the production of value-added 
manufactured goods. It could permit Kazakhstan to avoid the “middle income trap,” 
which can occur in a country with a small population, like Kazakhstan, and abundant oil 
and gas. This situation usually leads to high incomes with not much effort in terms of 
industrial innovation and economic efficiency.  
 
Kazakhstan appears to be subject to what the economist Barry Eichengreen calls the 
“middle-income trap.”46 He has found that when a country per capita GDP rises to 
somewhere between $1,000 to $12,000 per person measured in 2010 dollars, its 
economy suddenly stalls, and annual growth falls by at least two percentage points a 
year. It gets stuck in the lowest end of the middle. Countries in that situation hit the wall 
because easy gains out of low-productivity sectors (oil and gas) and in higher-
productivity sectors, as well as from technology transfers, have reached the exhaustion 
point. This is exactly where Kazakhstan is perched. A country with  limited number of 
comparative advantages will be caught in the middle income and the constant 
policymaking uncertainty resulting from hydrocarbon price fluctuation. 
 
Escaping the middle-income trap, as a country like South Korea has done, requires the 
creation of a functioning, competitive large-scale internal economy. Astana at least has 
a sense of the importance of this goal since in the 2011 presidential election. 
Nazarbayev‟s election program was known as “Kazakhstan 2030” with the slogan, “Let‟s 
Build the Future Together.”47 Whether the Kazakhstani elite can pull it off is a matter for 
debate. 
 
Developing closer trade relations with China entails risks for Kazakhstan. There is an 
ongoing debate as to the ability of the Chinese economy to maintain during the next five 
to ten years, growth rates as high as those experienced during the first decade of the 
21st century. For Kazakhstan, beneficial economic cooperation with China will ultimately 
depend on its neighbour‟s prosperity. For many years, economic analysts, in both China 
and the West, have been warning policymakers about the pitfalls of an overheating 
Chinese economy.48 
 
Ambose Evans-Pritchard, an economic analyst for The Telegraph, keeps repeating, 
often in a quite pessimistic way, that China may face the problems of household over-
expenditure in the not-too-distant future.49 Forbes analyst Shaun Rein, on his part, has 
for years been warning about a looming dot-com bubble in China,50 a dangerously 
increasing inflation rate, real estate problems and the U.S.-China trade tensions.51 The 
2010 World Economic Forum and Bloomberg‟s analysts have also identified worrying 
signals of economic overheating.52 Even though the odds are low for a “hard landing,” 
this scenario cannot be ruled out completely.53 
 
The Kazakhstani economy is expected to become more and more dependent on 
China‟s investments, manufactured goods and energy imports. It runs the risk of being 
exposed to a dependence on one all-powerful partner, as well as this partner‟s 
economic fortunes or misfortunes. All in all, this would mean substituting a dependency 
on hydrocarbon exports for a dependency on a single trading partner. Oddly enough, 
this hazard may be averted because authoritarian regimes are notoriously wary of a too 
strong bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In effect, Astana is, to some extent, 
cautious about China‟s plans for the region, and consequently prefers to adopt a 
gradualist approach in the Kazakhstan-China bilateral relations rather than to let Beijing 
move in on Kazakhstan‟s assets in one big swoop.54  
 
Astana under Nazarbayev has put in a lot of effort to enhance the Kazakhstani 
economic presence in the West and the former Soviet republics. In fact, one of the main 
features of Kazakhstan‟s foreign policy is the so called “multi-vector” approach, which 
seeks to advance Kazakhstan‟s national interests by balancing those of the West, 
Russia, and China, and “Integration and openness to the entire world.”55 It follows that 
Kazakhstani embassies and delegations abroad are actively committed to attracting 
investment from all corners of the world.  Such activism is remarkable in many respects, 
especially as it is achieving concrete results. However, when Kazakhstan‟s geographic 
location is factored in, any optimism about the country‟s long term prospects for 
development and prosperity is somewhat dampened. Despite its size (it is the world‟s 
ninth largest country) Kazakhstan is landlocked and abuts two colossal economic 
partners, Russia and China. Other Central Asian states are in no way capable of 
offering comparably promising opportunities for economic cooperation. This largely 
explains why Astana has embarked on a journey to elevate Kazakhstan to the status of 
“great power” in the Eurasia region, while keeping windows that open in the direction of 
the West. 
 
Chinese migration 
 
If Chinese investments and low price goods are generally greatly welcomed by both, 
Central Asian governments and their citizens, the same cannot be said about Chinese 
immigration, temporary or permanent. Complaints about incoming Chinese workers are 
being heard more and more throughout Central Asia. Sometimes Central Asians‟ 
criticism is even directed at Chinese immigrant workers who build strategic 
infrastructures, which would never see the light of day without China‟s financial and 
logistic input. Such negative sentiments are particularly strong in Kazakhstan, whose 
low population size and density pale in comparison with those of prosperous China. An 
increasing number of Kazakhstanis are fearful of a Chinese demographic expansion in 
their country. Many also accuse Beijing of conspiring to colonise Central Asian 
countries.56 Chinese attempts to lease a vast swath of Kazakhstani land in 2010 were 
not well received by the local population, and this led to fierce and unusually large-scale 
protests.57 Kazakhstani are afraid that what awaits them is a demographic situation 
resembling that of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang autonomous region, which lies just across 
the border, where the majority status of Uyghurs in the total population has been 
progressively reduced as a result of a massive influx of ethnic Han, who are set to 
become the majority in a not-so-distant future.58 Astana cannot afford to ignore the 
possibility of such a scenario unfolding in Kazakhstan also, as it could prove a powerful 
impediment to economic integration between the two countries. 
 
 
A double dilemma for Kazakhstan 
 
Kazakhstani political authorities may have to face a harrowing policy dilemma. They will 
have to either fully open up the country to China‟s economic projects and become more 
and more dependent on the economic performance of a neighbour which will soon have 
a GDP approximately one hundred times larger than that of Kazakhstan, or put up legal 
and economic ramparts against Beijing‟s foreign policy manoeuvres and limit itself to 
pocketing only a fraction of the potential benefits, which could be brought about by 
closer bilateral relations. The Kazakhstanis‟ growing feelings of hostility towards 
Chinese penetration undoubtedly make it harder for Astana to solve this dilemma. 
 
Niklas Swanstrom, Director of the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and 
Development Policy, is one analyst who believes that the China-Kazakhstan relations 
will not develop much further than their current level, precisely because Nazerbayev 
and his entourage seem uninterested in setting in motion closer cooperation.59 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the China-Kazakhstan political and economic cooperation has achieved 
impressive successes. The two countries are developing ties primarily in the energy 
sphere, while China seems to be encouraging Kazakhstan‟s economic diversification. 
However, to diversify the Kazakhstani economy Chinese investment alone may not be 
sufficient. Astana has to demonstrate a strong political will to successfully alter the 
economic structure, even though this may deprive the “oligarchs” of their control over 
whole business sectors. Kazakhstan‟s cooperation with China on security-related 
matters has economic dimensions, which may ultimately prove to be more crucial than 
pure mutual military assistance. In fact, Kazakhstan could become an indispensable ally 
in Beijing‟s efforts to quell social unrest in Xinjiang. The Kazakhstan-China economic 
integration will rub off on both countries to Xinjiang‟s benefit. In this regard, the 
promotion of trade in border areas is particularly important. 
 
There are drawbacks associated with further cooperation, though. Depending too much 
on China may be dangerous for Kazakhstan. A serious economic downturn experienced 
by China would spillover to Kazakhstan, much in the same way that an economic 
recession in the United States has always deep consequences for Canadian markets 
and exporters. Moreover, the two countries might be close to reaching the limits of their 
cooperation. The wariness of Kazakhstani officials over China‟s growing power and the 
local population‟s fear of the Chinese demographic expansion may prove to be 
insurmountable obstacles to future cooperation between the two countries. In any event, 
Kazakhstan‟s national economic problems are unlikely to be solved in the nearest 
future.  
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